The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which aze extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is shown that on the class of bargaining games the MCvalue coincides with the Raiffa-Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Furthermote, two characterizations of the MC-value are provided on subclasses of NTU-games whích need not be convex valued. 1'his allows (or a comparison between the MC-valuc and the egalitarian solutiou introduced by Ralai and Samet (1985).
Introduction
Since the introduction of NTU-games by Aumann and Peleg in 1960, many solution concepts have been proposed for this general class of games which extends both the class of TU-games and the class of bargaining games. Most of these solution concepts are based on well-known solutions for TU-games. For example, the Shapley NTU-value (Shapley (1969) ), assigns to each NTU-game a set of outcomes based on so-called a-transfer TU-games associated to this NTU-game. It is well-known that the Shapley NTU-value is an extension of the Shaplcy value and the Nash bargaining solution'to NTU-games. Based on this fact Aumann (1985a) developed a characterization of the Shapley NTU-value using the characterizations of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953) ) and the Nash solution (Nash (1950) ). For the Harsanyi value (Harsanyi (1963) ) a similar reasoning can be followed.
An alternative way to extend the Shapley value to NTU-games was introduced in Maschler and Owen (1989) and (1992) . Their consistent Shapley value is a singlevalued solution concept based on the following idea: First, the notion of the Shapley value is extended in a straightforward way to so-called hyperplane games, and, based on this extension, a value for general NTU-games is defined by associating hyperplane games to a general NTU-game.
Another solution concept for NTU-games is the compromise value introduced by Borm, Keiding, McLean, Oortwijn, and Tijs (1992) . This solution concept for NTUgames is based on ideas underlying the r-value for TU-games introduced by Tijs (1981). The compromise value is a single-valued solution concept that assigns to each NTU-game a payoff vector which is a compromise between an upper and a lower bound for the core. In Borm et aL (1992) , and Otten, Borm, and Tijs (1994) it is shown that the compromise value can be considered as an extension of the r-value for TU-games and the Rai(Fa- Kalai-Smorodinsky (RKS) solution for bargaining games (Raiffa (1953) , Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) ).
In this paper we introduce a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic 0normalised NTU-games, the marginal based compromise value, or shortly, the MCvalue. This solution concept assigns to each game an etFcient outcome lying on the line through 0 and an upper value, which is based on marginal contributions of players to coalitions. These marginal vectors are extensions of the marginals for TU-games, which can be used to describe the Shapley value. We show that the MC-value by definition extends the Shapley value and the RKS-solution to monotonic NTU-games.
Moreover, we provide two characterizations of the MC-value. The second one illustrates that also axiomatically the MC-value can be considered as an extension of the RKS-solution.
The most natural candidate for a comparison with the MC-value is the egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985) . Not only because both solution concepts are defined for NTU-games which are not necessarily convex valued, but mainly because for both solution concepts the outcome is determined by a starting point and a vector which indicates the direction to move in order to obtain an efficient outcome.
The main difference between the MC-value and the egalitarian solution is that this direction is fixed for the egalitarian solution and for the MC-value the direction depends on the game, which seems far more natural.
The paper is organised as follows.
In section 2 we start with notations and some basic definitions. Marginal vectors for monotonic NTU-games are defined as an extension oí the marginals for TU-and hyperplane games.
In section 3 the MC-value is introduced, and it is shown that the MC-value extends the Shapley value for TU-games, the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games, and the RKS-solution for bargaining games to the general class of NTU-games.
Section 4 discusses several properties of the MC-value and yields two characterizations of the MC-value on large subclasses of NTU-games. Also a comparison between the MC-value and the egalitarian solution is provided.
Finally, we conclude this paper with some rernarks and open problems in section 5.
NTU-games and marginal vectors
We start with some notations. Let N be a finite set. A coalition is a subset of N.
By RN we denote the set of all functions from N to R. The elements of RN will be Conditions (ii) and (iii) are standard. Condition (i) is a 0-normalisation whieh is not very restrictive either. IL is irnposed only for the sake of convenience. Note that we do not require the sets V(S) to be convex. So this allows for utility functions which are not necessarily of the von Neumann-Morgenstern type (cf. Kalai aod Samet (1985) ).
The set of all NTU-games with player set N is denoted by I'N. Often we identify an NTU-game (N,V) with V. NTU-games, introduced by Aumann and Peleg (1960), form a rather large class of games which comprises the well-known class of transferable utility games (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) ) and the class of cooperative a (pure) bargaining games (Nash (1950)). Let V be an NTU-game. The core of V, denoted C(V ), consists of all payoff vectors attainable for the grand coalition N which are not dominated by any coalition S, i.e., and the }larsanyi value (Narsanyi (1963)). These sohition concepts are based on the Shapley value for TU-games. Other solution concepts for NTU-games based on different principles and for various classes are the egalitarian solutions by Kalai and Samet (1985) , the consistent Shapley value (Maschler and Owen (1989), (1992)) and the compromise value (Borm et al. (1992) ).
Before we introduce the MC-value, we first remark that for TU-games the Shapley value can be viewed as the unique efBcient convex combination of 0 and the sum s of the marginal vectors. ' Therefore, the Shapley value can be regarded as a compromise value, i.e., a value which assigns to each game an outcome which is an efficient compromise between an upper value and a lower value for the game. This observation leads us to the following definition. 'This was pointed out by Carles Rafels.
The 0.normalisation we imposed is not very restrictive: the MC-value can be extended to a covariant value on the dass of all monotonic games in the following way: Translate an arbitrary monotonic game into a 0-normalised game, compute the MC-value for this game, and then tranelate it back to obtain a solution for the original game.
(iii) On the class of bargaining games the MC-value coincides with the Raiffa-Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution.
The proof is straightforward and there(ore it is left to the reader.
We conclude this section with a modified version of an example of Shafer (1980) which has led to an interesting debate on the interpretation of the Shapley NTUvaluc (cL Aumann (19856, 1986) , Roth (1986)).
Example 3.4 Consider the following exchange market ï with thrce agents and two commodities. The initial commodity bundles w`of the agents 1,2 and 3, and the utility functions u; are given by w~-(1 -~,0), w2 -(0, 1-c). w3 -~~,~). and for (xi,~x) E Rt ni(ri.rx) -u~(zi,x2} -min{z~,xi}, t~s(Ti,xx)i(z~-ixs).
HercOGcGs.
The corresponding NTU-game (N,V) is given by {(t,,t~,t, ) E R" I t, t tz f t,~l, t,~l, t,~l, t, G t}.
Note that V is not 0-normalised if e~0. If we compute the MC-value of this game by following the approach described in footnote 2, we obtain A4C(V) -( 5 -5 f, 5-5 c,~f 5c). 12 12 1'2 12 6 6
This outcome is also prescribed by the Shapley NTU-value. However, other solution concepts such as the compromise value and the Harsanyi solution yield different outcomes (see for example Borm et al. (1992) ). There the outcome for player 3 is 0 if e-0, while the MC-value and the Shapley NTU-value always give a positive payoff to player 3 of at least e. This fact has been a topic in an extensive discussion about We have the following characterization oí the MC-value on the class Im. (Ci(x, e) ), it follows that Ci(x, e) C Wo(N). Hence,
x E int(Wo (N) ), which yields a contradiction. So the claim is proved. If we compare theorem 4.3 with the characterization of the egalitarian solution given 3~~s~~denotes the Euclidean norm of x E RN.
Symmetry and weak Pareto optimality of F and the MC-value imply F(W) -
4Note that we only use an even weaker version of symmetry, which states that if all players in a game are symmetric, then they will all receive the same payoff.
1'?
in Kalai and Samet (1985) , it is striking that in both characterizations a monotonicity property plays a crucial role. It should be remarked that the MC-value dces not satisfy the monotonicity property which is used to characterize the egalitarian solution, and the latter does not satisfy the conditional monotonicity property introduced above.
Another aspect which justifies the comparison between the egalitarian solution and the MC-value is that both solution concepts are based on a payoff vector which can be considered as a starting point and a direction in which to move from the starting point to an efficient outcome for the grand coalition. However, for the egalitarian solution this direction is independent of the game under consideration, while for the MGvalue the direction is determined by the game. As a consequence of the fixed direction the egalitarian solution sometimes yields counterintuitive outcomes, and moreover, it does not satisfy Lhe covariance property. Therefore, the egalitarian solution depends on the utility representation oC the preferences of the players. It remains an open problem, however, whether an axiom system for the MC-value can be developed based on characterizations of the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953 ), Young (1985 ).
Concluding remarks
It is well-known that for TU-games the core is contained in the convex hull of the marginal vectors (Weber (1988) , cL Derks (1992) ). Hence, for TU-games this`Weber set' is a'core catcher'. Shapley (1971) 
